Fateful questions in front of Hezbollah policy

The recent Israeli strike that targeted the Iranian depth was not a transit event in the regional conflict. Its direct impact extended to one of the most prominent external allies of Iran, Hezbollah, who suddenly found itself at the defense site, not the attack, in front of fateful questions related to its function, its ability to respond, and the limits of its movement.

Political realism imposes an in -depth reading of the party’s website after the strike: Does it have the decision to intervene? Or is the Lebanese, regional and international reality pushes it to something similar to strategic paralysis? Did entering a new war become a possible option, or a burden that has no ability to bear it?

Certainly today, after the Israeli war that destroyed Lebanon last summer, it seemed that the internal Lebanese reality does not constitute a fertile ground for any new military adventure. Since the start of the limited confrontation on the southern front after October 7, 2023, Hezbollah’s environment has been subjected to huge losses, most notably assassinations that affected political and field leaders, headed by the party’s Secretary -General, Mr. Hassan Nasrallah, in addition to a comprehensive destruction in the southern infrastructure, the displacement of hundreds of thousands of population, amid almost complete absence of the state, and a clear slowdown in the flow of aid.

Added to this is the reconstruction crisis, which has become politically conditional, and the donor countries have linked any actual funding to a change in the position of the party and its weapons. This reality created mobile crises within the party’s incubating environment, which began, in a soft voice, reviewing the cost of the conflict and the feasibility of the continuation of the confrontation equation in the current form.

It is not possible to jump over the internal congestion, which did not stop at the boundaries of the Shiite environment only. The sharp political division, and the government’s inability to start a workshop for reconstruction and administrative reform, all of which are elements that are pressure towards calm, not escalation. There is no internal cover for war, nor a unified Lebanese position that can give the party the legitimacy of the broad response, which increases the embarrassment of its leadership in front of an audience that began to feel that the war has become in vain, and that no one shares it in cost or decision.

If Hezbollah has succeeded in decades in stabilizing its regional presence through the supply network that extends from Iran to Lebanon via Iraq and Syria, then this path is almost suspended. Syria, which was a strategic depth of the party, changed its bases. President Ahmed Al -Sharaa’s rise to power, and the Gulf and Western openness to Damascus, reconstituted the trends of the Syrian regime.

The new system, which seeks to rehabilitate itself on the international scene, is not like to enter again in the game of themes, especially if the price of this is to blow up any negotiating path with the West, especially since Syria today is in an experimental stage.

This shift puts the party in front of an operational predicament, as the Syrian border is no longer open as it was, just as Damascus, which the party has experienced and allied with it for three decades is ready to support the role of the regional party, in light of the talk about opening an Israeli-Syrian negotiating path, which makes Hezbollah a burden even for those who were considered an ally.

There is a clear confirmation of the international and regional parties that the region’s drawing and Lebanon for war has become unbearable. Since the first hours of the strike, regional and western capitals have opened communication channels with Hezbollah, in an attempt to contain the situation. During these parties, the party heard their demands not to be drawn into a response, or at least seized it within the Lebanese border, and prevent any breadth in the war.

It is noteworthy that these mediations did not come as a result of the fear of a direct Iranian response, but rather the possibility of Hezbollah as a platform to ignite an expanded regional war, which Washington and its allies seek to avoid, contrary to what Benjamin Netanyahu aspires to, who is betting on a comprehensive explosion that re -confuses the papers.

To date, the party deals with great caution. Relax to respond, but he does not pledge it. He issues calm signals, but it does not make the decision to go towards activating the response. So inheriting is the title, not because the party does not want war in defense of the most prominent ally, but rather because its conditions are no longer available as before.

What is certain is that Hezbollah, like other parties, is awaiting developments in the new regional reality to build on it, especially with the upcoming visit of the American envoy to Syria and Lebanon, Tom Barak, who will hold an offer similar to what was previously carried by his predecessor Amos Hakstein months ago, which requires an Israeli withdrawal from Shebaa Farms, in exchange for Hezbollah withdrawal from the conflict equation. But this time, the show is not wrapped in diplomatic softness. Barak comes with a decisive message: “Either the full acceptance of American conditions, or leaving Lebanon to its fate in the face of Israel.”

The initiative goes beyond just the border file. It is part of broader regional arrangements that include Syria, which is pushing for normalization with Tel Aviv in exchange for security guarantees, and reconstruction deals. And Lebanon, if refusal, will leave its fate, with an explicit American threat not to continue mediation or provide political protection.

This path carries radical repercussions on Lebanon. If a Syrian -Israeli settlement takes place, Lebanon will be isolated, which will go to its crisis, while Damascus is moving towards regional reintegration. Then, Hezbollah’s weapon will not return a power card, but rather a strategic burden for the parties to the conflict in the country.

Hezbollah is aware of the size of the weight and the event, which is outside a fierce war that resonated for all the East and Morocco, and therefore it will seek to avoid engaging in a thorny military epic, based on the Lebanese Shiite reality, geographical challenges and internal facts that he cannot overcome in any way.