“The warplanes are not safe just because their air bases are far from the fighting front. The attacking drones may be released from a truck near the Al -Qaeda wall,” Rand Center, 2021.
In the ancient battlefields, the armies were adopting castles and dependent on the height of the walls and the thickness of the walls. But with the development of weapons and attack tactics, the castles often turned into graves of those in them. In early June 2025, it was repeated Drivers aircraft Ukrainian in Russian airspace listed this story in a new language, but in an ancient sense: not everything that seems immune, it is safe, nor everything that is crouching in air rules that are able to survive with humiliating tinnitus.
On that day, there was no sound of the bomber, nor a flash of long -range missiles, only a heavy silence that was raised by a low -low bust that quickly turned into flame balls hitting at least 4 Russian air bases that extend over vast geographical areas, from Olinia Air Force Base 150 kilometers from the Russian Finnish border, to Belia Airport in Siberia 4,500 kilometers from the Russian -Ukrainian border, as well as two air bases near the capital, Moscow.
During hours, sudden pictures, burning bombs, destroyed runways spread, the attack was not a missile, nor attributed to great powers, but was carried out with small drones. The Ukrainian president himself announced that his country carried out an operation called the “Spider Network” with about 117 drones transported to Russian territory by trucks, after a year and a half planning, and he was proud that the attack resulted in the destruction and damage of about 34% of the Russian strategic aircraft carrying Cruise missiles.
Russia has preserved since its inheritance of the Soviet Union a traditional military structure that sees the weather bases a stone Corner Its strategic flame. Thanks to its long-range “TU-95) and” TU-1660 “launchers and strategic aircraft equipped with Cruz missiles, Moscow has been building a large part of its nuclear and traditional deterrence on its weather capabilities from the geographical depth of immune. The Russian air defense doctrine assumed that the strategic depth Wide and the integration between air defenses is guaranteed to fortify these rules from any direct air threat.
The strike was not only surprising in its extent and boldness, but also in its qualitative nature, which revealed a profound shift in the logic of the air war. Ukraine used low -cost technological means to destroy high symbolic goals and standing, and proved that the Russian air defense, despite its bright reputation and complex armament, did not develop to counter new threats.
What happened was merely a security breach, but rather a collapse of the traditional air deterrence model. The security of the Russian air bases was exposed to a resounding slap, not due to its lack of equipment, but rather because it was unable to protect itself from the pattern of war that exceeded the familiar, and revealed the fragility of deterrence when the threat does not keep pace.
Here the deepest story begins: Why did Russia seem unable to protect its bases? Is what happened at the end of the era of the “fortified air base” in the modern war?
Rand Center and Early Monitoring
Throughout the twentieth century, the air bases have represented heavy centers in the military doctrines of the great powers. From the American Pearl Harper airports -which blew the war in Pacific Ocean I pushed Washington For World War II, to rules NATO The fortified in Western Europe- The air bases were always a pivot axis that enhances the ability to initiate the initiative, transfer the war to the lands of the opponents, and deter them before they approached the lands of the defending state.
The revolution has contributed to military affairs since the 1990s, including high accuracy and air superiority of the major powers, to make the weather rules be built around the strategy and not just being logistical tools to serve operations.
However, as contemporary wars enter the decentralization and unresponsive, the air bases have become open targets around the clock, at a constant threat of small and cheap, able to embarrass defensive empires costing billions of dollars.
This shift prompted military thinking centers, led by the Rand Center of the US Air Force, to study the possibility of the collapse of traditional air defenses, the challenges inherent in defending the air bases by studying their weaknesses, and rethinking their position, structure and distribution.
An intense summary of the numerous Rand studies that dealt with the topic is that dependence on central, large and fixed air bases represents a strategic risk. These rules, despite their ability to operate a large number of aircraft and provide highly efficient logistics, turn into perfect targets for an attack by enemies that use accurate or difficult to monitor, such as small enlightenings or low radar signing missiles.
One of the most exciting proposals in Rand studies is to warn of “interior” threats, whether by publishing Drums In areas close to the air bases, or by using civilians or irregular fighters to launch surprising attacks.
In a report entitled “Defending the Air Rules in the era of small drones” issued in 2021, experts warned that the small size of the drones and their low cost makes it an ideal tool for attack inside the depth, especially if it is launched from close distances that are difficult for traditional defenses to deal with.
In another report issued in 2020 entitled “Defense of the Air Rules: Reflection on the Environment of Threats”, the Rand Center warns that the logic of the “effective mass”, which has always ruled the operation of the major weather bases, is no longer appropriate in a combat environment that has become saturated with micro -sensors and long -term offensive capabilities.
At a time when one missile can paralyze a runway or destroy the head of a major planes inside a sprawling base, the abundance of capabilities turns into a shame, and the dependence on one huge base becomes a heavy strategic weakness, not a source of strength.
Consequently, the report called for the mixing of active defense by air defense systems, negative defense by hiding, distributing them, and using camouflage facilities, which Russia did not do according to the video clips showing the Ukrainian attack, as Russian aircraft appear crouching on the air runways without protection or camouflage.
And everything that was said in Rand’s literature seemed to be a distant theoretical expectation, until the last Ukrainian attack came to prove – towards a shocking – that the most likely threat is no longer an academic assumption, but rather a field reality that reshapes the maps of power in the contemporary war.
The messages of the Ukrainian attack on Russian air bases
The Ukrainian attack in June 2025 on 5 air bases was not essential in the Russian deterrence system and the Russian air capacity, merely a tactical escalation, but rather it can be considered a qualitative shift in the pattern of war that Ukraine has been waging against Russia since 2022. This attack was the first integrated attempt to undermine Russian air deterrence within the strategic depth, using unconventional means, in a very daring review and tight planning.
The Ukrainian attack relied on a perfect mixture of small -sized aircraft smuggled into Russia, and fired by camouflaged trucks from very close distances from the vicinity of the targeted bases, and as part of simultaneous attack waves to confuse the Russian air defenses.
Despite the controversy over the size of the injuries: Are they 41 Russian aircraft, as Ukrainian military intelligence says? The matter is limited to 13 aircraft, according to what you reported Washington Post Quoted from satellite pictures and videos? It was sent Ukraine Several messages by the aforementioned attack, the most prominent of which is that the battle is no longer border, but rather entered the depth of Russia, as it is supposed to be the most fortified areas, and it has proven that in the war it is possible to balance the discount that exceeds the flexible tactics that nullify the old balance equations.
Perhaps the most important loss was psychological and political, as the image of the protected sky that Moscow promoted, not only in front of Ukraine, but in front of NATO Alliance As well as friendly countries that monitor Russia’s ability to defend themselves.
And those meanings were confirmed by a study published by the Rand Center in 2022, entitled “The Air Force under the Siege”, where it focused that hitting the air bases is not only intended to destroy the planes, but also rocked the morale of the opponent, dismantling its confidence in its air control, and undermining the confidence of the soldiers and leaders in the state’s ability to protect them, which Ukraine did with skill. The media circulated the scenes of the fire inside the Russian territories, and social media were buzzing with explosions, which transformed the operation from a military achievement into a loud blow to the prestige of Russian deterrence.
The Ukrainian attack has proven that protection does not only lie in geographical depth or in the density of defenses, but rather in the flexibility and atypical thinking. Perhaps this is what makes the attack read, not only as a successful military and security operation, but also as a deep reshaping of the defense of deterrence in the ethical wartime.
How do Rand studies explain what happened?
If the Rand Center experts spoke about the Ukrainian attack on the Russian air bases, they would say, “The scenario that we warned of it was fulfilled, but in Russia This time, not in the Pacific or Gulf Ocean. ”The Ukrainian operation has provided an ideal application of what their studies on the fragility of the major weather bases in the modern fighting environment indicated.
In the study of “defending the air bases in the era of small drones” a clear warning says, “The offensive cost of the calamities is steadily declining, while the cost of defense remains based on exorbitant systems.
Another study added that “the large base is a goal that can be monitored and monitored with satellites, disrupting it with a missile, and neutralizing it with an inexpensive tool. The more it is, the greater its fragility in front of an asymmetric enemy.” This is what the Ukrainian attack literally embodied.
The Rand Center has also repeatedly confirmed that active defense, such as anti -aircraft artillery or air defense systems, cannot alone deter non -asymmetric attacks that come from several axes using simple offensive tools. Where were the S-400 systems or the Russian Bantuzer when the misfortunes infiltrated? Some of them were monitored after the attack only, while others were not activated because there was not enough warning.
Russia has chosen for reasons -related to belief, traditions and structures Bureaucracy– To keep its weather bases is more like a concrete cement castle for the eye. Here, the imbalance in the understanding of “deterrence” appears when it is based on the review, not on the calculations of technical development, it becomes fragile in front of a opponent who possesses the will and initiative, even if he does not have the budget or complete power.
An attack that does not resolve the conflict
The Ukrainian attack proves that the logic of war changes. Excellence in the number of aircraft, the size of the bases, or the development of radars is no longer sufficient. Rather, the important thing is innovative thinking designed to undermine the rules of the game. He explained that the air deterrence, as we knew it during a whole century, collapses in front of everyone, and is replaced by a new logic that mixes low technology with subtle strikes.
The attack on the strategic air bases in the depth of the country despite its danger, but it does not change the balance of the military forces overnight, as it occurs slow erosion in Russia’s confidence in the concepts of deterrence and strategic depth, and may contribute to the reconstruction of the Russian military doctrine itself in the post -war stage.
In return with Moscow Several options for the response, such as intensifying missile strikes on the Ukrainian military and infrastructure, as a retaliatory response aimed at showing that the cost of targeting the Russian depth is painful, or even carrying out qualitative attacks in the Ukrainian depth targeting leadership centers or foreign military advisers.
Beyond this attack, not only Russia, but also includes every country that relies heavily on its weather strength and its fixed rules. If the Russian strategic bombers were struck in the depth of depth, what prevents the repetition of the scenario or its simulations in other locations?
In conclusion, controlling the sky no longer only means loud flying with faster the sound, or the deployment of air defense batteries along the fronts. The sky itself has become a changing field, controlled by electronic chips and drones. In this new field, the question is no longer: Who controls the sky? But who realizes that the sky has changed?