The confrontation between Turkey and Israel in the Syrian arena is not reduced to the traditional security dimension, but it goes beyond it to other files, foremost of which is the economy and the ambitions under them in achieving great influence and achievements that fall under the concept of the broader national security of each of them.
The natural gas file is one of the most important points of stampede and an unannounced motor for the dynamics of competition between the two powers in Syria. The transformations in the region have opened since October 20, 2023 horizons in this file, and at the same time created obstacles that may change the map of the acquisition of the wealth of the eastern Mediterranean and domination of supply lines in the region.
From this standpoint, the natural gas file in the eastern Mediterranean region gives the Syrian scene a geopolitical perspective, especially with the presence of a large, fixed and valid reserve stock in Syria, in addition to the possibility of its transformation into a point of intersection of the company’s supply lines with Türkiye.
Israeli gas and geopolitical competition
After the discovery of Tamar fields andThe loops AndCarrichIsraeli leaders set their eyes to turn them into a vital focal point for exporting and transporting energy from the region to Europe, in addition to the enormous financial returns, this will make it an effective regional and international player.
Although these fields are not met with the production of major gas suppliers in the Gulf, the Israeli government promotes the production of Tamar and Levithan fields alone to about 40 billion meters cubic annually, which was reinforced by former Israeli Energy Minister Yoval Steinitz by saying that “the development of gas reserves is of great economic and strategic importance to Israel.”
A report issued by the Institute of National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University indicates that the importance of Israeli gas lies in establishing new alliances, as well as opening diplomatic channels with regional and international parties.
In this context, Israeli researchers, such as Ilan Zlaite and Josensky, a researcher at the Institute of National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University, warn that the growing Turkish influence in Syria, if translated through the implementation of future pipelines for Gulf gas, may weaken Israel’s weight as energy source to Europe, because the latter prefers to diversify its sources instead of relying on one provider.
The experts pointed out that allowing Turkey to establish a wide infrastructure for gas in Syria will enable it to compete with Israeli projects with Cyprus and Greece, which may lose Israel strategic opportunities in the eastern Mediterranean.
Syria in Türkiye’s invasive accounts
On the other hand, Türkiye moves an ambition stemming from the realization of its decision makers to the value of Türkiye’s position in the energy map to turn into a basic corridor and a regional center that nurtures European markets.
The stability of power in Syria – according to the Turkish vision – is a factor that enables Ankara to impeding energy projects between Israel and countries in the region, as it can provide alternatives or paths far from Israeli plans.
After Israel was looking at the Syrian scene from the point of view of the Iranian security threat with the absence of the possibility of the future threat of economic ambition related to the supply of natural gas, it was observing with concern the pipelines that may pass in the near or far through Syrian lands to transport Gulf gas to Europe via Turkey, which gives Ankara a reckless force that may prevent Israel from extending greater influence in the eastern Mediterranean.
Israel has also been afraid of Turkey’s engagement from the Syrian gate as a decisive player in the demarcation of the border with Lebanon, which limits the Israeli ambition to dominate the disputed marine areas that glorify its share of exploring gas fields and discovery.
Although Türkiye’s role in demarcating the borders between Lebanon and Israel has not officially emerged, it seeks a regional presence that links its influence in Syria with any subsequent naval arrangements that may re -draw a map of the exploitation of gas fields, including Lebanese gas.
Also, any influence of Ankara in Syria will be reflected in political equations in Lebanon, given the historical equation of the Syrian influence in the structure of Lebanese politics and powers.
Reinstatement
Since the establishment of the East Mediterranean Gas Forum, which the Turks assume that it came within endeavors to exclude it or even as an attempt to establish a coalition based on hostility to Turkey – as former Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavashoglu – Turkey has sought to resist it within a regional equation in which a strong party is difficult to exclude or marginalize.
As a result, he sent ships to exploration, east of the Mediterranean, protected by a military one, in addition to signing agreements to demarcate the borders of pure economic areas, such as an agreement with the former Libyan Al -Wefaq government.
In addition to the foregoing, Ankara will seek to conclude exploration and investment agreements in the potential Syrian marine gas that may range near 400 billion cubic meters of the overall pelvis, which contains precautions estimated at 122 trillion cubic meters, according to the American Geological Survey, which will restore, in parallel with other files under the formation, drawing the entire regional scene and its features are contradictory to the logic of exclusion and dominance that Israel aspires to reach it.
Reviving the Turkish Qatari gas line
Perhaps the Qatari gas line proposed by Doha in 2009 – which was denied by the former Syrian regime at the time – is one of the most prominent evidence of the centrality of Syrian lands in any regional energy project.
According to a report by the Guardian newspaper, if this line is completed, it would take a path across Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria and Turkey towards Europe, which gives Türkiye a huge logistical and economic strategic advantage.
Qatar at the time sought to complete preliminary agreements with Damascus that included the passage of the pipeline, but the Syrian regime’s tendency for an Iranian project parallel to $ 10 billion in the interests of Russia failed this project.
Ankara and Doha are likely to seek to revive this line, and Turkish Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, Alp Arslan Bayrakdar, indicated “the possibility of reviving the Qatari proposal after the fall of the Assad regime if Syria reaches a degree of stability and security.”
It is worth noting that the Qatari gas pipeline across Saudi Arabia and Jordan to Türkiye will cost, according to specialists, approximately $ 10 billion, and will reach about 1500 km in length, and will be a parallel alternative to Russian gas supplies for Europe.
Perhaps what raises Israel’s concern in this context is not limited to economic competition alone – and if it tries to impose itself as a natural gas exporter – but rather extends to geopolitical accounts that affect its regional influence.
If it is written for this project to see the light, both Qatar and Turkey will have a strategic weight, which may reflect negatively on the regional importance that Israel aspires to consolidate through joint gas alliances and projects with its allies.
Stability tainted or inevitable?
Economic considerations with security are intertwined with the tendency towards searching for an increase in regional influence to confirm that the Israeli -Turkish confrontation in Syria cannot be reduced with a threatening security dimension on the northern border of the occupying state, as it overwhelms the spaces of political debate.
But what is the expected behavior of both countries in light of the need for calm and stability as a prior condition for the success of energy projects? Will Israel find itself in front of difficult options in which it is subject to the fact that there is a contradictory and parallel line in its dominance of the region?
It is not so easy for the two powers to reach a gas approach that is the result of harmony, as the facts indicate that any understanding between Israel and Turkey will be bound by contradictions.
Therefore, the gas is likely to turn into a mutual extortion weapon that each side uses against the other, so Israel does not want to depend on the will of Turkey if the gas begins to flow through its territory towards European markets, and Turkey does not want to lose an opportunity that prevented the Assad regime falling to achieve its vision by turning a crossing of power lines that cannot be overcome.
But if the two sides continue to escalate, the crisis will be exacerbated, and Israel will pushing to seek opportunities that threaten stability in Syria, in addition to seeking to establish more regional alliances and more rapprochement with the countries of the East Mediterranean Forum such as Cyprus, Greece and Egypt, and to strive to persuade the Europeans of the centrality of Israel’s invading status and intimidation of the dependence of Turkey.
At the same time, in contrast, Turkey will search for strengthening its field influence in Syria in a way that guarantees it to impose a reality and equation that is impossible to jump in any international gas project, and it is likely that it will revitalize the Qatar Gas Gas project, in parallel with its current efforts to provide the conditions of stability and political unity in Syria, and support the consolidation of the new system, and will cut the road firmly in front of attempts to divide Syria and will put that according to the logic of its national security.