The second war scenario on Iran policy

The war on Iran stopped on June 24, after Washington bombed the most important Iranian nuclear project: Natanz, Isfahan, and Fordo.

After the conclusion of the 12 -day battle, a widespread controversy in the United States and Israel alike, regarding the battle, has achieved its goals; President Trump, remarkably, affirmed on more than one occasion the destruction of the Iranian nuclear project, in response to security and media reports that questioned the feasibility of the American strike.

If the war is measured by its targets, the Netanyahu Benjamin defines it by eliminating the nuclear project, undermining the missile capabilities of Iran, and changing the regime as a result of the war and re -drawing the Middle East.

These goals in their entirety have not yet been achieved, even the Iranian nuclear project is difficult to decide that it was destroyed, and it was permanently removed from service, not to mention the fate of 400 kilograms of listed uranium.

In this context, Raphael Grossi, director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, pointed out the difficulty of determining the extent of damage to nuclear facilities until after their visit.

Iran, in turn, cut the way for the International Atomic Energy Agency of suspending cooperation with it, after accusing the agency and its director, Rafael Grossi of collusion with Israel, and paving the aggression against Iran.

This reality complicated the real estimation of the level of damage that affected the nuclear project, at a time when Tehran confirms that it secured its stock of firm uranium, and that it “will not give up nuclear technology”, and that it can resume uranium enrichment within a short time if desired, as stated by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqji.

Advertising does not cancel a reality

Israel can declare victory and boast about it, but this is what it eradicates if it is contrary to their claim and claim.
On July 1, Benjamin Netanyahu, Benjamin Netanyahu, indicated that Iran sought to build three strategies against Israel, he said, namely: building an Iranian nuclear project, a missile system, and axis of allies against Israel.

This indicates that Israel, according to this perspective, still lives in the heart of the battle and not its end, it was unable to eliminate the nuclear project, nor did it undermine the missile system of Iran, nor did it eliminate Iran’s allies or friends in the region.

It is true that Israel has weakened the Lebanese Hezbollah, but it is still present and can throw itself structurally and military, and Hamas is still fighting an exceptional fight despite the humanitarian catastrophe that the occupation made in Gaza for 21 months.

Also, the popular crowd in Iraq was not harmful, and Yemen and Ansar Allah, despite the American and Israeli strikes, show the ability to control and influence international trade paths through the Bab al -Mandab, and to harm Israel and pressure it in support of Gaza.

The reality of the situation says that Israel has achieved important achievements in the face of Iran, but the latter did not raise the white flag and did not give up, and it is expected that it will try to advance strongly after the Israeli aggression against it, and the emergence of the size of the threats to it and its national interests.

The recovery march

The Israeli strike, which did not succeed in defeating Iran, will push it to restore its accounts on the basis of internal immunity, and to possess the features of the strategic power of Israel, on several expected tracks, including:

• Firstly: The immunization of the home front in the face of external threats, based on the solidarity and unity of the Iranian people (opposition and loyalty), during the recent battle, not to mention cleaning its house from the customer network, and the electronic penetration mechanisms of its political and institutional body.
• secondly: Clalation with its nuclear project, and the development of its missile systems, which proved its ability and found in the last confrontation, in addition to the restoration of its air defense systems in front of Israeli aviation, a goal that represents a real challenge to Tehran in light of the compound accounts of its ally Russia, who are unwilling to anger President Trump, and Israel with good relations, which drives Iran to search for other sources.
• Third: The advancement of its network of anti -Israel relations, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, the popular crowd in Iraq, and Ansar Allah in Yemen. The last battle has proven the importance of the Lebanese Hezbollah power; Israel would not have dared to hit Tehran if Hezbollah was his well -being as before.
  This trend in Iran reinforces Israel’s approach to its beaches through the policy of normalization, and Washington’s efforts to restore Israel’s position in the Arab region, by expanding the circle of normalization between it and additional Arab countries.
• Fourth: Consolidating its relations with neighboring countries, especially Pakistan and Turkey, which supported Iran’s position and its right to defend itself, in a sense of them because of the seriousness of Israel in the endeavor to change the map of power and political geography in the region.
  President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s talk about Ankara’s endeavor to possess defensive capabilities for any party that could think about provoking Turkey, indicating Turkey’s concern about the repercussions of the war on Iran, and the hypothesis of targeting its interests later in light of the decline in confidence between it and Israel, and the turmoil of the political relationship between them due to Turkey’s support for the Palestinian position, and its growing influence in Syria.

Preparing the battle against Iran

If Israel launched its aggression against Iran for reasons that still exist, and to achieve political and military goals that have not yet been achieved, and if the attack brought in reverse effects in Iranian behavior, then this means that the hypothesis of Israel launched a second attack on Iran is possible and expected.
Netanyahu’s claim to achieve victory over Iran does not necessarily reflect the reality of the Israeli position and its security estimates on achieving goals.

Israel, in its political faith, does not accept the possession of Iran or any Arab or Islamic country as a nuclear project, or the possession of a competitive military force throughout the region and the Middle East.

This reminds us of what happened with Iraq, which was invaded and destroyed under the pretext of possessing weapons of mass destruction, and the goal was to get rid of the power of Iraq as an Arab state against Israel.

Israel may find in the current circumstance a favorable opportunity to launch another blow to Iran, before the latter was able to restore itself and restore its capabilities and its option for any upcoming battle, and this is conditional on two things:

The first: Israel’s readiness internally and military

Stopping the war on Iran is an opportunity for Israel to fill the gaps that appeared during the previous battle, to provide appropriate weapons and fill its warehouses of ammunition.

In this regard, Washington’s approval was a few days ago, to provide Israel with ammunition worth $ 510 million.
Not to mention that Netanyahu may take advantage of the level of popular support for him in Israel, because of his recent attack on Iran, in order to make another attack.

Second: President Trump’s approval

According to an opinion poll conducted by the University of Quinobak, after the war on Iran, a overwhelming majority of Republicans supported the United States joining Israel in military strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites, as this supported 68% of the ages of 18 and 49, while 87% of the ages of 50 and more supported him.

This approach to the majority relaxes President Trump, who was afraid of his fans’ reaction, which he brought to the White House under the title: “Let’s make America great again”, by paying attention to the economy and avoiding depleted wars.

Here remains the ability of Netanyahu and his team to persuade President Trump that any other operation against Iran will not threaten energy sources in the Persian Gulf, which is estimated at 20% globally, and that the process will be lightning and decisive, which will bring Iran surrendering to the negotiating table, without this surgical process have great repercussions on the region or the American and international economy.

It is not excluded that reviving the path of negotiations with Hamas and the Palestinian resistance in Gaza, and seeking to reach a 60 -day truce in the hope of reaching a permanent ceasefire, that it is intended to reduce pressure on Israel internationally because of its crimes in Gaza, and to give it the opportunity to focus its military operations against Iran.
Netanyahu’s introduction to his visit to Washington, from the end of July until the beginning of the second week of it, indicates that there is a call for a urgent meeting at a high level.

This urgent visit to Washington is not necessarily to discuss Gaza, as much as it is related to the discussion about Iran and its nuclear and missile project, and what options are to deal with it, in addition to Israel’s political relations in the region, and the possibility of expanding the circle of normalization between it and other Arab countries.

Netanyahu’s visit will take regional dimensions related to the completion of the tasks to re -draw the Middle East, in the context of exchanging roles between Washington calling for peace, and between Israel with the heavy hand, backed by Great America, and its president who sees that he is concerned with achieving the will of the Lord and the prophecy of heaven with the support of “Greater Israel”.