Since her return to power in August 2021, she faces a government Militant In Afghanistan, a dual challenge is to manage a country that suffers from economic and humanitarian crises, and seeking to break the diplomatic isolation resulting from its official international lack of recognition as a legitimate government.
Despite this isolation, the Taliban showed remarkable diplomacy, as it succeeded in expanding its relations with major regional and international countries, China accepted an ambassador from the Taliban in Beijing in 2023, and in April 2025 Russia announced the acceptance of the candidacy of the Taliban ambassador in Moscow, while Pakistan raised the level of diplomatic representation with Afghanistan to the degree of the ambassador, with the Taliban announced the treatment of ideal.
These developments raise a set of questions about the challenges facing the Taliban in their endeavor to break the diplomatic siege? And the regional and international motives that motivate some countries to open up to the Taliban government, despite the lack of official recognition of it? And the nature of the relationships that are built between them and these forces?
This reality also raises questions about the extent of the impact of this openness on the internal situation in Afghanistan, politically and economically, and to what extent can the Taliban site be reshaped in the international arena without being associated with legal recognition of the legitimacy of its rule.
Taliban diplomatic isolation context
In August 2021, the Taliban took control of Kabul after the withdrawal of American forces, which ended two decades from the Western supported government.
Despite its full control of Afghan lands, the international community refused to recognize the Taliban government because of what is said, that they are concerns related to human rights violations, especially its restrictions on the rights of women and minorities, and its strict policies in education and public freedoms.
To this day, no country has officially recognized the Taliban government, but it has succeeded in managing the 40 Afghan embassy and consulate in the world, and has developed actual diplomatic relations with countries such as China, Russia, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Qatar, the UAE and Central Asian countries.
These relations, despite the absence of official recognition, reflect the Taliban strategy and its diplomatic institution represented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to break the diplomatic siege by exploiting regional interests and geopolitical competition.
Diplomatic communication and political recognition
Despite the remarkable activity of Taliban on the international scene, the diplomatic interaction witnessed by the movement does not necessarily mean that it obtains an official political recognition.
According to followers of the Afghan affairs, a distinction must be separated between diplomatic communication, which includes technical meetings, exchanging delegations, and dialogue in specific issues, and political recognition, which represents an international legal procedure that gives full legitimacy to any ruler system.
An Afghan diplomat expert – who is not to be named – told Al -Jazeera Net that “many of the meetings that the Taliban are conducting with the neighboring countries and the international community come in a technical or objective framework, and do not carry deep political connotations and do not reach the level of dealing with a recognized country because political recognition requires a sovereign decision from the relevant state, and it entails extensive legal and diplomatic obligations, including formal representation in international forums,” said an Afghan diplomat expert – stipulated that his name should not be mentioned – to Al -Jazeera Net.
Until the moment, none of the permanent members initiated in Security Council To recognize Taliban as a legitimate government, just as the countries of the region are still dealing with them with caution, preferring to keep at a limited level of communication.
Nevertheless, observers note that the Taliban continues to follow an active foreign policy and engage in regional forums, may gradually contribute to softening international positions towards it, and opens the door to a new stage of re -evaluating relations with them, even without reaching the level of full recognition.

In the context of the increasing diplomatic moves pursued by the Taliban in the recent period, the statement of the Victorial of the Afghan embassy in Qatar, Suhail Shaheen, to Al -Jazeera Net, affirms the Afghan caretaker government to present itself a more realistic and open political party to international cooperation.
Shaheen says that “the Islamic emirate, based on its principles, seeks to establish constructive and balanced relations with the countries of the region and the world, and is keen not to engage in any political or military conflicts between countries.”
“The doors of Afghanistan are open to foreign investments, especially in the sectors of the economy, mining and infrastructure development, provided that this cooperation does not contradict the national interests of the emirate and the Afghan people,” added the Afghan Chargé d’Affairs in Doha.
These positions express the Taliban’s attempt to redefine their role in the regional and international system, by emphasizing stability, non -intervention, and economic openness, although it is still conditional on not prejudice to the political principles that they adhere to.
Recent diplomatic developments
In a prominent step, Russia announced in April 2025 the acceptance of the nomination of the Taliban ambassador in Moscow, after the movement was removed from the list of terrorist organizations.
This decision reflects Moscow’s desire to enhance its influence in Central Asia, and to confront security threats from organizations such as “”ISIS Khorasan ProvinceAs well as exploiting economic opportunities in Afghanistan.
In May 2025, Pakistan announced the raising of the level of diplomatic representation with Afghanistan to the degree of the ambassador, with the Taliban’s response, and this step comes in the context of Islamabad’s efforts to secure its borders, and to confront the tensions resulting from the Taliban attacks, as well as strengthening regional trade.
As for China, it was a pioneer in this field, as it accepted an ambassador from the Taliban in Beijing in 2023, without announcing an official recognition, and Beijing aims to protect its interests in a region XinjiangAnd expanding an initiative Belt and roadAnd benefit from Afghan metal resources such as lithium and copper.
“His credentials will be officially submitted to the President of the United Arab Emirates soon during an official ceremony.” The Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is run by the Taliban, announced the appointment of its first approved ambassador in the Emirates, which is the second country that accepts a envoy from the Taliban government at this level after China
For more: … pic.twitter.com/p1bnxNfsjc– aljazeera.net • Al -Jazeera Net (@AjArabicnet) August 22, 2024
Countries such as Iran, the Emirates, Turkey and Qatar have shown an increasing openness to dealing with the Taliban, with diplomatic and commercial talks, and Central Asian countries, such as Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, have developed communication channels to secure their security and economic interests.
According to a report of the “Rose Analysis” website, the foreign policy of the Taliban has recently turned from retreat into a pattern of “conditional active diplomacy”, as the movement intensified its international movements with visits, receiving delegations, and participating in regional activities, despite the lack of official recognition.
The site adds that “this diplomacy, and if it seems more vital, remains limited and restricted with political and human rights obstacles, in light of the continuation of sanctions and the requirement of the international community internal reforms to ensure any deeper rapprochement or institutional support.”

Regional and international motives
Regional and international motives for openness to the Taliban are launched from a sterile mix of economic interests, security considerations, and geopolitical accounts.
On the economic level, China is seeking to integrate Afghanistan into the “Belt and Road” initiative and exploit its huge metal resources, which are valued at about a trillion dollars, as well as protecting its investments in regional infrastructure projects.
As for Russia, you see in Afghanistan an opportunity to expand its commercial markets and ensure safe energy corridors towards South Asia.
For its part, Pakistan is working to enhance cross-border trade and reach the Central Asian markets, especially through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), as well as securing investment flows towards their border areas.
Security, Beijing fears the transfer of turmoil from Afghan lands to the Shinjiang region, where separatist groups of Uighur nationality face, while Moscow seeks to contain the threat of the “Islamic State of Khurasan”, in which it sees a direct threat to the stability of the Central Asian republics.
Pakistan, in turn, is facing ascending in the “Taliban Pakistan” attacks, leading it to documenting cooperation with the Afghan Taliban to control border security.
As for a geopolitical perspective, China and Russia are trying to fill the void left by the American withdrawal from Afghanistan and strengthen their influence in the region as two alternative powers from the West.
While Pakistan is seeking to maintain its strategic depth in the face of India, which began to return to the Afghan file with calculated diplomatic moves.

Challenges of breaking the siege
Despite the positive diplomatic steps that the Taliban government has achieved in strengthening its relations with some regional countries, facing fundamental challenges that hinder the dismantling of the diplomatic siege on them.
At the forefront of these challenges, its controversial record in the human rights file, especially its strict policies towards women that include preventing them from education and work, which led to a clear frequency among Western countries in providing official recognition or political support.
On the internal level, security threats, led by “ISIS Khorasan Province”, constitutes a continuous dilemma that threatens stability, in light of leaks on internal divisions within the Taliban between moderate and extremist currents, which weakens its ability to present the image of a unified and powerful government.
Economically, the situation remains complied with the freezing of assets and the suspension of international aid, which exacerbated the economic crisis.
In the regional context, the Taliban faces a complex task in balancing their relations with China, Russia, Pakistan and Iran, amid a clear competition between these forces, as well as Western pressures that hinder the granting of official recognition of Taliban, which limits official international cooperation.
One of the most prominent challenges facing Afghan diplomacy under the rule of the Taliban is the clear contrast between the positions of the political leadership in Kabul and the directions of the leader of the movement. The prestige of God Akhund Zadeh Resident in Kandahar.
At a time when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and government departments in the capital are trying to adopt a more flexible and open speech in a diplomatic language aimed at improving the image of the regime externally, Kandahar is issued from militant strict positions that reflect a strict ideological vision, which leads to confusion in political messages and undermines confidence -building efforts with the international community.
This contrast highlights a central decision -making problem within the movement, and raises questions about the extent of the Taliban government’s ability to present a coherent and reliable foreign policy.

Afghan political analyst Mohamed Musab says that “duplication in decision -making centers within the Taliban, between Kandahar and Kabul, represents a serious obstacle to the formation of a harmonious foreign policy.
While the Ministry of Foreign Affairs seeks to send reassurance messages to the world, statements or decisions from the Supreme Command sometimes weaken these efforts and reproduce the movement of the movement as a closed ideological destination, not as an internationally handable international partner.
Although some capitals, such as Beijing and Moscow, accept the Taliban ambassadors, the absence of official international recognition deprives the movement from fully involved in international institutions such as the United Nations and the World Bank, which restricts efforts to reintegrate Afghanistan into the global financial system.
The negative media image of Taliban remains an additional obstacle, as Western countries are taking advantage of this situation to justify the continuation of sanctions and isolation, which leads the Taliban to rely on regional partners who do not link their relations with tangible improvements in the field of human rights.
The intensification of the movement of travel and diplomatic meetings of Taliban reflects a shift towards a greater realism in its foreign policy, but it remains limited unless the movement meets the basic demands of the international community because diplomacy is not just official meetings, but rather depends on building confidence, transparency and commitment to the principles of the international system.
The Taliban seeks to break isolation and openness to the world, but the way towards international recognition and stability is long, and to achieve this – as Mohamed Musab says – “The movement needs deep reforms in government, legislation and social policies, as the success of its diplomacy is related to the compatibility of its external discourse with its internal behavior.”

Differences and expectations
In light of the American withdrawal and the decline in the Western presence in Central Asia, the region is witnessing an accelerated reconstruction in the balance of power, led by China and Russia by strengthening their political and economic influence, while competition between India and Pakistan is escalating from expanding the circle of influence in Afghanistan, threatening to ignite new foci of tension in the region.
Despite the complications, observers believe that economic initiatives, especially those led by Beijing, represents a potential crane to achieve a degree of relative stability, in an environment that is still risky.
It is expected that the circle of regional and international interest in Afghan affairs will expand, especially by Asian and Gulf countries, without this necessarily translated into an official recognition of the Taliban government.
In this context, the Taliban’s ability to make fundamental reforms, especially in the human rights and rights file, remains an essential axis in the assessment of the international community for its eligibility for partnership.
Analysts believe that the movement of the movement is a diplomat that requires a more balanced approach in its foreign policies, and avoid engaging in international conflicts, while preserving internal harmony that takes into account popular requirements in political and economic reforms.
And between the pressure of the outside and the challenges of the interior, the success of the Taliban diplomacy remains dependent on its ability to adapt to the standards of international legitimacy, without neglecting its political identity, which is an accurate equation that may determine its position on the map of regional and international relations in the next stage.