On Monday, July 14, 2025, US President Donald Trump alluded to a fundamental shift in his approach to the Russian war on Ukraine. He announced his intention to send additional additional units from air defense systems to Ukraine, at a time when its cities are under a medium daily attack that exceeds 100 aircraft and a Russian missile.
Leaks from the White House stated that he asked Ukrainian President Volodimir Zellinski during a previous phone call about the type of offensive weapons that Kiev needs to hit Moscow directly.
Trump has also launched the strongest threat of sanctions so far, proposing to impose 100 % secondary customs tariffs on countries that buy Russian oil, if Moscow does not agree to a ceasefire within 50 days, that is, by September 3.
But despite his hard -line dialect, these statements have not made a significant change. Russian officials mocked his talk about Moscow. As for air defense shipments, and despite their importance, their delivery to the quantities that Trump spoke of will take many months.
Trump’s threats of energy markets have not stirred, although such a measure is equivalent to attempting the third largest oil producer in the world.
But the change in Trump’s position on Russia should not be surprising. Despite what appears to be his personal admiration for Russian President Vladimir Putin, his vision of American strategic interests is radically inconsistent with Putin’s vision.
Trump wants to export more American gas, while Putin is seeking to compensate for his loss of European markets by exporting Russian gas through alternative markets.
Trump is interested in Greenland for its location on the future loading routes, while Russia relies on a competitive polar road to enhance China’s support for it. Putin wants to control the largest possible number of Ukrainian metal resources, and Trump wants the same thing but for Washington.
Trump had retreated, albeit late, from his initial pledge to end the conflict in one day, which later admitted that he was exaggerated. His old hostility to Zelinski, who is due to the scandal of his attempt to blackmail the Ukrainian president in favor of his campaign against Biden (which led to his account for the first time in Congress), has eased after Kiev agreed to a long -term strategic partnership with Washington on mineral resources.
Trump realized that Putin was not negotiating with a sincere intention. The peace negotiations between Kiev and Moscow in May and June did not make any progress, but only the two parties attended to satisfy Trump and gain it to their ranks.
Perhaps Trump’s awareness came after Putin raised the ceiling of his demands during these negotiations. He insisted on controlling all the southern and eastern Ukrainian regions that he claims to include, although he did not impose his full control over it, but rather added the demand to establish a “buffer zone” in northern Ukraine as well.
To date, Trump’s changes have not made a real influence for two reasons:
- First, because his threat to impose customs duties on Russian oil does not seem serious on its own. Trump has always warned of high oil prices, and has publicly criticized the jump in oil prices after his strikes to Iran in June.
- Second, because the imposition of secondary customs duties has not been proven previously. Trump used a similar threat against Venezuela’s exports in March, and despite its temporary decline, it returned to rise after Beijing increased its purchases from it.
In light of the trade war between Trump and China, which witnessed American threats to impose a 100 % fee, it is unlikely that Beijing is likely to be interested in the largest buyer of Russian oil, with a similar threat.
Trump’s decision to give Moscow until September 3 may complicate the passage of a draft law in the Senate that imposes additional sanctions on Russia, although 83 out of 100 members of the Council are participating in its patronage. The leadership of the Republican Party of the Senate and Representatives is also cautious about the anger of Trump, which calls for almost absolute control over the policies of his party.
Although Trump pushed Europeans to publicly recognize that their support for Kev is costly – their collective support has exceeded what the United States has provided even before the start of Trump’s second state – American equipment and technology will remain the basis of Ukraine’s ability to resist or change the course of war. However, the delivery of new weapons and the training of Ukrainian forces to use them will take time.
Trump will have to change his approach. The United States cannot put an economic pressure on Russia to force Putin to negotiate seriously on its own, but rather a multilateral approach, which is difficult to achieve when Washington clashes with its allies and partners.
Regarding additional restrictions on Russian oil exports, Trump’s chances of persuading Moscow are few. But such restrictions may push India to change its position. New Delhi has turned from a marginal buyer of Russian oil before the comprehensive invasion to its second largest market, and now 40 % of its imports.
Indian Oil Minister Hardip Singh Buri said last week that his country would not change its position, noting that it had committed to previous restrictions such as the roof of oil prices approved by the Biden administration in cooperation with the Group of Seven in 2022.
The purpose of this ceiling was to allow the continued flow of Russian oil, but with reducing its revenues, in order to avoid market turmoil. It is a logic that Trump still mimics, and was previously supported by US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen to secure “oil deals” of India and developing markets.
But the Indian minister added that his country may reconsider its position if there is an international agreement to change the pattern of Russian oil.
If Trump wants his threats to Moscow is reliable, he must adopt an international approach.
Some steps are easy to take. While the Trump administration hesitates to impose new sanctions, Brussels and London are leading efforts to target the Russian “hidden fleet” used to circumvent the sanctions and price ceiling, and propose new packages of sanctions, including adjusting the oil price ceiling when the prices are low.
The European Union has approved two penalties during the past six months, the last of which was on July 18, and Trump is supposed to accelerate the adoption of the same procedures.
If Europe is also able to support the imposition of secondary customs duties or other sanctions on Russian oil buyers, this will increase the effectiveness of the procedure. Trump can also target Russian LNG exports by inserting the “Novak” company, the main exporter, in the sanctions list.
Europe has not yet made this step, but only announced its intention to buy gradually by the end of next year. However, since the liquefied gas tanker market is much smaller than the oil carrier market, previous US sanctions on Russian LNG projects were more difficult to circumvent them.
The Russian economy is finally groaning under the weight of Putin’s war and all the resulting sanctions. Reports indicate that Russian banks have started preliminary discussions on the conditions for their rescue by the state.
With this suffering, Russia claims to have controlled a town in the Dnipropterrovsk region (central Ukraine), a claim that Kiev denies and has not yet been verified. Trump can actually affect the course of the war if he abandons his resistance to allow Ukraine to hit the Russian energy infrastructure.
Trump may have announced a new approach to Russia, but whether this approach will exceed the limits of the discourse, depends on the extent of his willingness to work with partners and allies, and the consequences of this pressure bears.
The opinions in the article do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Al -Jazeera.