Since Donald Trump’s arrival at the White House, senior Israeli officials, along with a number of American officials, have been introducing what is known as the “Libyan model” as a negotiating model to deal with the Iranian nuclear file.
In this context, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said, at the end of his visit to the United States in May 2025, saying: “We agree that Iran should not have a nuclear weapon.
Netanyahu added: “The second possibility, which is not desirable, is that Iran extends the negotiations, after which the military option will be presented. Everyone realizes this, and we have talked in it in detail.”
In the same context, Republican Senator Tom Cotton said in May of the same year: Trump prefers that the agreement with Iran is similar to that, which Libya signed with the United States in 2003.
However, there has been no clear research yet what Israel intended specifically from the “Libyan model” in the context of negotiating with Tehran. This model is first characterized by a sharp skeptical view of Iran’s intentions and behaviors in its nuclear, regional and missile files, and secondly, with a fundamental opposition to the relative reconciliation approach adopted by the “Combating Comprehensive Program” agreement (the nuclear agreement) concluded in 2015. This model is based on the assumptions and agenda of the right -wing current in Israel.
The “Libyan model” in the eyes of Israel
This model consists- according to Israeli reading- from several major elements that cannot be imagined without it. The demand for “the fully dismantling the Iranian nuclear program is one of the most frequent items when talking about this model in the international media. This means completely rejection of any form of enrichment inside Iran, and under any circumstance.
As for the other dimensions of this model from the perspective of the Israeli military and security circles, it includes:
- The presence of an effective military threat against Iran, while maintaining the option of the military attack, even if an agreement is reached.
- Obliging Iran with permanent pledges that cannot be referred to.
- Make the mechanism of lifting the sanctions temporary and non -permanent, so that it can be re -imposed at the first Iranian breach, contrary to what was stated in “sunset items” with the 2015 agreement.
- Expanding the scope of negotiations to include Iranian regional influence, the two programs: missile and running planes, and not being satisfied with the nuclear file.
- Reaching a quick and immediate agreement without engaging in long and exhausting negotiations such as those that spanned between 2013 and 2015.
Thus, it is clear that what Israel calls the “Libyan model” is not limited to the dismantling of the Iranian nuclear program, but rather extends to include a more comprehensive approach aimed at ending Iran’s regional role as well. Tel Aviv has not yet moved to the Iranian file to process the Iranian file directly after October 7, 2023, due to its complexities, and the need to coordinate with Washington to ensure its full support for any proposed option.
One of the reasons for this delay, in addition to Israel’s preoccupation with wars in Gaza and Lebanon, is the belief that the administration of Joe Biden, although it was a security supporter of Israel, has not shown enthusiasm towards the option of hitting Iran. In the second term of Donald Trump, the complexities of the ongoing talks between Tehran and Washington have been complex so far without enabling Israel to move militarily against Iran.
However, it appears that Israel is preparing to open a new equation against Tehran after October 7, through a series of hidden attacks, which mostly include assassinations of prominent figures, vandalcies targeting vital infrastructure, and attacks on strategic military bases.
The Israeli analysis starts from two basic timelines. The first is that Trump’s return to the White House represents a “golden opportunity”, coincides with a coincidence of the weak regional axis supporting Tehran. The first months of Trump (from June to the end of September 2025) is an exceptional moment that may not be repeated. It seems that Israel realizes that neglecting it will be an unforgivable mistake.
In this context, the more the current negotiations path from the “Libyan model” increases, the more incentives of Tel Aviv to carry out qualitative operations aimed at influencing these negotiations and imposing a new deterrent equation. Even if Iran and the United States reach an agreement, Israel may see that the moment requires a response.
As for the second timetable, it is linked to the upcoming Israeli public elections, scheduled for October 27, 2026. The situation of the Netanyahu government is still very weak after the shock of October 7, and the opposition is awaiting toppling it through the ballot box.
Consequently, Netanyahu believes that carrying out a major operation against the “Iranian enemy” may be the only remaining political lifeline. This process is implemented before the elections approached a lot, because its proximity may reduce its required electoral impact.
Iran and Libya .. fundamental differences
Despite the deep impact of US sanctions on the Iranian economy, which may be exacerbated in the event of activating the “trigger mechanism”, Iran’s foreign and regional policy has witnessed in recent years a remarkable openness; From strengthening relations with Russia and China, to an agreement to resume relations with Saudi Arabia in March 2023, the return of relations with Bahrain, then raised relations with the Sultanate of Oman to the level of strategic partnership. All of this confirms that Iran is not isolated as Libya was.
Unlike the Libyan nuclear program, which was limited and expatriate from abroad, the Iranian nuclear program has been extending for decades, and some experts have returned its beginnings to 1941. Iran has developed its program locally, making it difficult to eliminate it permanently; Tehran can restore it even after its destruction.
Windy Sherman, the former US Secretary of State and Senior negotiators in the nuclear talks, commented: “Any attack on Iranian nuclear facilities may delay the program for a year or three, but Iran will quickly reinforced it quickly. Let me be frank: you cannot bomb science and knowledge.”
In addition, unlike the Libyan experience, Iran has a relatively successful negotiating record, starting from the 2002-2003 negotiations and ending with the 2015 agreement, which makes it unrealistic expecting an international deal with it in the same way that it deals with the Gaddafi regime.
The Iranian model?
Rapid progress in the ongoing negotiations between Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqji and the American President for Middle East Affairs Steve Witkeov, indicates that the current negotiating climate is clearly different from the Israeli offering, as the collision and hostile vision is absent.
Although there is no confirmed details about the text of the potential agreement, Tehran appears to not accept the idea of permanent abandonment of the right to fertilization. The maximum that it agreed to be the suspension of fertilization for a period of 6 months, in exchange for an official recognition of its right to fertilization, and a comprehensive suspension of all the penalties – including secondary sanctions – by the American President, which can be described as the logic of “suspension in exchange for comment”.
Among the other Iranian proposals is the formation of an international consortium to oxidation of its uranium stock, and reduce fertilization rates from 60% to 3.6%, with admission to discuss the details later.
Summary
The Libyan model, as Israel, is proposing it more extreme than the United States seeks in its current negotiations with Iran; From a complete dismantling of nuclear establishments, and the rejection of the right to enrichment, to impose permanent obligations, maintain military threat, strict requirements for lifting the sanctions, and immediate expansion of the negotiation scope.
However, the deep differences between the Iranian and Libyan cases – in terms of self -capabilities, diplomatic presence, and the negotiating record – make the application of this model very difficult.
According to the current indicators, Israel may find from June to September 2025 a suitable time window to carry out hidden operations against Iran, with the aim of creating a new deterrent equation and confusing the path of negotiation between Tehran and Washington. However, the “Libyan model”, with its Israeli content, looks much further than realistic.
The opinions in the article do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Al -Jazeera.